The Aviation Noise Abatement Controversy: Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines, and the Legal Liability Shuffle by Werlich, John M. & Krinsky, Richard P.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
12-1-1981
The Aviation Noise Abatement Controversy:
Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines, and the Legal
Liability Shuffle
John M. Werlich
Richard P. Krinsky
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John M. Werlich & Richard P. Krinsky, The Aviation Noise Abatement Controversy: Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines, and the Legal
Liability Shuffle, 15 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 69 (1981).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol15/iss1/3
THE AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT
CONTROVERSY: MAGNIFICENT LAWS,
NOISY MACHINES, AND THE LEGAL
LIABILITY SHUFFLEt
by
John M. Werlich *
Richard P. Krinsky**
I. INTRODUCTION
Citizens of this nation, especially those residing near airports,'
have endeavored for two decades to stem the burgeoning tide of airport
noise, which may cause significant physical or psychological injury2 or
may be simply annoying Since the commercialization of jet aircraft,
federal, state and local governments have enacted a plethora of laws
t The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Department of Airports, City of Los Angeles or the Federal Aviation
Administration.
* Assistant City Attorney, City of Los Angeles, Airport Division; B.A. 1967, California
State University at Long Beach; J.D. 1970, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
** Attorney, temporarily with the Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, Washington, D.C.; former member, President's Task Force on Aircraft Crew Com-
plement; B.S. 1962, Alfred University; M.A. 1970, University of Alabama Graduate School
of Business; J.D. 1981, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.
I. "Approximately six million U.S. citizens currently reside on 900,000 acres of land
exposed to levels of aircraft noise that create a significant annoyance for most residents."
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY
17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Noise ABATEMENT POLICY]. For a discussion of the method-
ology of measuring noise, see infra notes 20 & 90.
2. See, e.g., Birth Defects Linkedto Airport Noise, MED. WORLD NEWS, Apr. 3, 1978, at
84 (increased incidence of birth defects linked to aircraft noise); Herridge & Chir, Aircraft
Noise and Mental HospitalAdmission, 6 SOUND 32 (1972) (nervous breakdowns found more
prevalent around Heathrow Airport than in quieter areas); Meecham & Smith, Effects of Jet
Aircraft Noise on MentalHospitalAdmission, 11 BRIT. J. AuDIOLOGY 81 (1977) (higher pro-
portion of mental hospital admissions found near Los Angeles International Airport than in
less noisy areas).
3. "Although there may be indirect and subtle social and psychological harms, aircraft
noise is predominantly an annoyance problem. It does not present any direct physical
health danger to the vast majority of people exposed." NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra
note 1, at 17; see also Glorig, Non-Auditory Effects of Noise Exposure, SOUND & VIBRATION
May 1971, at 28 (to date, studies of the effects of noise exposure have failed to reveal any
harmful health effects).
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designed to attain relief from noise. Meaningful relief, however, has
not been achieved.
Through legislation, Congress has attempted to create a uniform
national noise abatement plan directed and monitored by one entity:
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).4 Unfortunately, this goal
has not been realized. Apparently in an effort to limit federal govern-
ment liability, the FAA has failed to assume the responsibility envi-
sioned in the federal legislation. In addition, the recent trend of
decisions by courts that have held airport proprietors liable for the per-
sonal injury and property damages caused by aircraft noise,' and Con-
gress' retreat from its previous policy favoring financial aid to noise
impacted airports, have also undermined the movement for a uniform
national aviation noise abatement plan.
The FAA's abdication of leadership, adverse court decisions, and
the reduction in federal financial aid have left airport proprietors to
fend for themselves. Spurred on by a rash of noise lawsuits,6 local air-
port proprietors, in a legitimate effort to minimize their liability expo-
sure, have adopted noise abatement regulations based on parochial,
rather than national, interests.7 These local regulations, in turn, have
caused further divisions in the effort to create a national aircraft noise
abatement plan.
The unfortunate consequence is that the labliy for aviation noise
has been partially disconnected from the responsibility for aviation
noise abatement. This is a result of decisions in which various courts
have held that the liability for aviation noise damages rests solely on
the hundreds of individual airport proprietors, while responsibility for
aviation noise abatement resides collectively among federal, state and
local governments, air carriers, and airport proprietors. This "single
liability/shared responsibility" situation promotes, rather than discour-
4. See infra text accompanying notes 8-57.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 64-74, 109-27.
6. See Burke, LegalRoar Over Jet Noire, The Nat'l L.J., Dec. 1, 1980, at 1, col. 2. "In
the last four years, at least 16 other cities [other than Los Angeles] have been faced with
airport noise claims in excess of $260 million." Id at 10, col. 1.
7. See H.R. REP. No. 594, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted/n 1976 U.s. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1600, 1603.
In addition, aircraft noise has resulted in curfews and other operational constraints
which have restricted the use of existing facilities, and have caused problems relat-
ing to the safety of the system. Because of noise emanating from the operations at
airports, full utilization and expansion of airports to accommodate current and
future traffic have been hampered.
[Vol. 15
1981] AVIATION NOISE BBATEMENT
ages, confusion. The result is unwarranted agony for all the parties-
particularly citizens living near airports.
This article will (1) review national aviation noise legislation and
its implementation by the FAA, (2) analyze the judicial decisions that
discuss the imposition of liability for aircraft noise, and (3) offer two
alternative approaches that would more equitably apportion liability.
II. FEDERAL LAWS AND FAA IMPLEMENTATION
A. Regulatory Provisions
1. Federal Aviation Act of 1958-the beginning
Federal regulation of airspace and air commerce is authorized
under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (1958 Act)8 which entrusted
certain powers to the FAA and to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).9
The FAA's responsibility under the 1958 Act, to be carried out primar-
ily through the promulgation of Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs),
was to promote air safety, regulate the use of the navigable airspace,
establish air navigation facilities, operate a national system of air traffic
control,10 and certify airmen, airplanes and certain airports for com-
mercial use." This exclusive federal control was based on Congress'
recognition that the public has a basic right to air transit. 12 Moreover,
the power to ensure such travel was declared to be a right of national
sovereignty. 13
8. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The 1958 Act, as amended, is the
basis of federal aviation regulations. This article is not intended to review all of its
provisions.
9. The authority, of the CAB is concerned primarily with the economic aspects of the
aviation industry. For the CAB's area of responsibility, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1321-1389
(1976 & Supp. 1111979). Theoretically, the CAB could regulate aircraft noise by refusing to
certify new routes or by suspending or changing existing ones. However, Congress, in
§ 401(e)(4) of the 1958 Act, placed limits on the CAB's power to do this. Moreover, the
CAB has never exercised this power, and, in light of the recent enactment of the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered sections of
18, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. HI 1979)), it is unlikely to do so in the future. The Airline Deregula-
tion Act will gradually bliminate the CAB's control over routes and fares. The Airline De-
regulation Act also provides for the phased elimination and transfer of the CAB's remaining
functions to other governmental agencies: the Department of Transportation, the Postal
Service, and the Department of Justice. By January 1, 1985, the CAB's functions will
terminate.
10. 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1976).
11. Id at §§ 1421-1432.
12. Id at § 1304.
13. Id at § 1508(a). "The United States of America is declared to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the United States. . . ." Iai
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2. Federal Aviation Act Amendments of 1968-aircraft noise
problem recognized
While the 1958 Act seemingly granted the FAA responsibility for
all aspects of aviation, it did not specifically authorize the FAA to es-
tablish limits on aircraft noise emissions or otherwise to regulate for
noise abatement purposes. 4 In 1968, however, Congress added section
611 to the 1958 Act. 5 This section recognized that there was a noise
problem and authorized the FAA to prescribe standards for the mea-
surement of aircraft noise and to establish regulations to control and
abate such noise. This grant of authority was limited, however. The
standards and regulations had to be "consistent with the highest degree
of safety" and be "economically reasonable, technologically practica-
ble, and appropriate for the particular type of aircraft."'6 Thus, the
resulting regulations were directed at the source of noise-the aircraft
itself-rather than at airport proprietors.
3. Part 36-FAA attempts to control noise at its source
In response to section 611, the FAA promulgated FAR Part 361
7
(Part 36) in 1969. Part 36 was the embodiment of the FAA's attempt to
control aircraft noise at its source. It provided a mechanism by which
aircraft noise could be uniformly measured. It also established maxi-
mum allowable noise levels (depending on weight and number of en-
gines) that aircraft of new design could not exceed in order to obtain
type certification.'" It did not address possible changes in flight proce-
dures to reduce noise, nor did it apply to then currently operating air-
craft. 9 The noise levels were expressed as an Effective Perceived Noise
Level (EPNdB) and permitted heavier aircraft to make more noise.2 °
The adoption of Part 36 encouraged new airplane types to be markedly
14. For example, although the FAA, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1976),
could certify aircraft as "airworthy," the certification had to be based on safety considera-
tions, not noise.
15. Federal Aviation Act Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-411, § 611, 82 Stat. 395
(current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
16. 49 U.S.C. § 1431(d)(3)-(4) (1976) (emphasis added).
17. 34 Fed. Reg. 18,364 (1969) (current version at 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1981)).
18. Before an aircraft may fly, it must first be type certificated. The FAA Administrator
is vested with the power to issue type certificates for aircraft. 49 U.S.C. § 1423 (1976). Type
certificates concern the basic design of an aircraft. Once a general design is type certificated,
all other aircraft built according to that design are entitled to type certificates. See Morton
v. Dow, 525 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1975).
19. 34 Fed. Reg. 18,364 (1969).
20. For example, depending upon the type of engine, the standard for most B-747-100
aircraft is approximately 108 EPNdB, the maximum noise output allowable. U.S. DEP'T oF
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quieter than the generation of turbojets developed in the late 1950s and
early 1960s.
Since 1969, Part 36 has been amended several times to expand its
coverage from newly designed domestic subsonic jet aircraft to all jet
powered and propeller driven aircraft. For example, by extending the
standards to newly manufactured domestic subsonic aircraft of older
design,2" the 1973 amendment significantly increased the number of
aircraft subject to Part 36. In a 1976 amendment, the FAA tackled the
most controversial aspect of controlling aircraft noise at its source by
requiring currently operating domestic subsonic aircraft with maximum
gross weights over 75,000 pounds to meet Part 36 standards.2 2 This was
accomplished by establishing a phased compliance program for all op-
erating aircraft.' Whether by retrofitting or otherwise, all operating
aircraft were required to comply with Part 36 standards on or before
January 1, 1985. However, effective February 1, 1981, the compliance
dates were extended for some types of aircraft to January 1, 1988,24 and
TRANSP. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 36-1B, CERTIFICATED
AIRPLANE NOISE LEVELS (1977); NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note 1, at 36.
Because people's reactions to noise differ widely, it is difficult to establish a simple
mathematical formula that accurately represents human reaction to noise annoyance. For
example, the noise emanating from a waterfall may produce more sound energy than the
screech of chalk across a blackboard. To many, however, the latter is much more annoying.
Even the experts are not in agreement on the relative merits of expressing noise impact in
terms of dB, dBA, dBD, PnL, EPNL, EPNdB, SEL, SENEL, CNR, NEF, CNEL, ASDS,
LdN or Leq. For the purposes of type certification, see supra note 18, the FAA utilizes units
of EPNdB (a unit of perceived noise that attempts to take into account the actual sound
energy received by a listener, the ear's response to that sound energy, the added annoyance
of any pure tones or "screeches," and its duration). NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note
1, at 13-14. On the other hand; the FAA has recently designated decibels (dBA) and the
yearly day-night average sound level (LdN) as the standards for determining the level of
airport noise exposure. 47 Fed. Reg. 8,338, 8,339 (1981) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 150).
For further information, see Callahan, Noise andits Measurement, MINNESOTA CITIES, Feb.
1980, at 26; Alekshun, Jr., Aircraft Noise Law: 4 Technical Perspective, 55 A.B.A.L 740
(1969).
21. 38 Fed. Reg. 29,569 (1973).
22. It was controversial primarily because of the potential economic impact on the air-
line industry of being required to retrofit (acoustically modify by applying sound absorbent
material), reengine or replace noncomplying aircraft. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,049 (1976). For ex-
ample, in 1976, the FAA estimated that modification of all affected aircraft would cost close
to one billion dollars. Id at 56,052.
23. This was effectuated by adding a new Subpart E to 14 C.F.R. § 91. 41 Fed. Reg.
56,046, 56,055-56 (1976) (current version at 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.301-.311 (1981). The FAA
adopted the phased compliance program because, as of the effective date of the amendment,
only 500 of the United States fleet of 2,100 large jet aircraft complied with Part 36. 41 Fed.
Reg. 56,046 (1976).
24. These include certain two-engine or three-engine aircraft under FAA approved re-
placement plans and certain two-engine aircraft under the small communities exemption
provisions. 45 Fed. Reg. 79,302, 79,313 (1980). Interestingly, neither Congress, which man-
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Part 36 was made applicable to foreign as well as domestic aircraft. 5
The last amendment was in direct response to a congressional
mandate.26
4. Noise Control Act of 1972-EPA climbs aboard
In 1972, Congress, apparently dissatisfied with the progress of the
FAA,2 7 passed the Noise Control Act of 1972.28 Among other things,
the Act amended section 611. In essence, it prohibited the FAA from
issuing an original type certificate to any aircraft that failed to meet
Part 36 noise standards.29 The Act also recognized a role for local gov-
ernments, but added the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
the regulatory process and required both the FAA and EPA to consider
the effect of aircraft noise on the public health and welfare. While the
FAA maintained regulatory authority over aircraft noise, it was man-
dated to hold public hearings on EPA proposed aircraft noise regula-
tions. The FAA,'however, was not required to adopt the regulations.
As a result, the EPA has had meager influence on the regulatory pro-
cess-nearly all EPA proposals have been rejected,30 sometimes after
dated this exemption, nor the FAA defined what constitutes "small community service."
One might have thought that the rationale was to encourage air carriers to provide service to
small communities and thus permit noisier aircraft to service those communities. In prac-
tice, however, the exemption applies to particular aircraft whether they fly to a community
with a population of 5,000 or 5,000,000.
25. In its Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, the FAA stated that it would unilaterally
impose its own aircraft noise standards on foreign air carriers unless the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) established a noise abatement schedule substantially similar
to Part 36. NoisE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note 1, at 42. The ICAO is responsible for
setting international noise standards. This was not done to the FAA's satisfaction, so the
FAA considered itself mandated by the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.A. (West
Supp. 1981)), to apply Part 36 standards to foreign air carriers. 45 Fed. Reg. 79,302, 79,305-
310 (1980).
26. 45 Fed. Reg. 79,302, 79,305-06 (1980).
27. During the first four years after the addition of § 611 to the 1958 Act, the FAA had
promulgated only one noise regulation, Part 36. This regulation applied only to new designs
for domestic aircraft and left both operating aircraft and foreign aircraft unregulated.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976), 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976). Actually, the Act addressed
much more than aircraft noise. Among other things, it mandated the EPA to set noise
standards for all products in interstate and foreign commerce.
29. 49 U.S.C. § 1431(6)(2) (1976). In other words, Congress wanted the FAA to apply
Part 36 standards to all newly produced aircraft even though aircraft of that type were al-
ready in operation, as opposed to those merely on the drawing boards. Aircraft that do not
comply with Part 36 standards as originally promulgated in 1969 include: all B-707s and
DC-8s; depending on engine type, most B-737s, DC-9s, and BAC 1-1 Is; some B-727s; and a
few B-747s. All DC-10 and L-1011 aircraft comply. NoisE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note
1, at 36.
30. To date, the EPA has proposed II regulations; only one has been adopted in full.
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long delays.
5. FAA's Noise Abatement Policy of 1976-a self-serving document
It is one thing for Congress to enact legislation and proffer its in-
tent through committee reports. It is quite another for the federal
bureaucracy to interpret the meaning of the legislation and promulgate
regulations. In 1976, the FAA issued its interpretation of congressional
intent in the area of aviation noise abatement when it published its
Aviation Noise Abatement Policy. In the FAA's view, single liabili y
for noise damages resides in the airport proprietor, but shared responsi-
bility for aviation noise abatement resides jointly among federal state
and local governments, air carriers, airport proprietors, and citizens.31
Taking into account the entire breadth of legislative history concerning
aviation noise law, the FAA postulated a "legal framework" that is best
stated in its own words:
1. The federal government has preempted the areas of
airspace use and management, air traffic control, safety and
the regulation of aircraft noise at its source. The federal gov-
ernment also has substantial power to influence airport devel-
opment through its administration of the Airport and Airway
Development Program.
2. Other powers and authorities to control airport noise
rest with the airport proprietor-including the power to select
an airport site, acquire land, assure compatible land use, and
control airport design, scheduling and operations-subject
only to Constitutional prohibitions against creation of an un-
due burden on interstate and foreign commerce, unjust dis-
crimination, and interference With exclusive federal
regulatory responsibilities over safety and airspace
management.
3. State and local governments may protect their citi-
Statement of Walter C. Collins, Noise Abatement Officer at Los Angeles International Air-
port (June 23, 1981). For example, on August 29, 1975, the EPA proposed two amendments
to the Federal Aviation Regulations which would have required pilots of all civil turbojet-
powered aircraftlo utilize a two-segment approach to a landing runway. Generally, a two-
segment approach procedure requires the pilot to fly an initial steep glide path segment (six
degrees) and to intercept the conventional glide path (three degrees) at 700 feet above the
elevation of the airport. This procedure was to be used under certain circumstances during
clear weather and upon approach to a runway that had an FAA approved two-segment
Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach procedure. Both proposals were rejected for
safety reasons. 41 Fed. Reg. 52,388 (1976).
31. NoisE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note 1, at 5-6, 29-34.
1981]
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zens through land use controls and other police power meas-
ures not affecting aircraft operations. In addition, to the
extent they are airport proprietors, they have the powers de-
scribed in paragraph 2.32
To alleviate the burden of these proprietary powers, the FAA de-
clared that it would support local airport proprietors' actions to abate
noise; however, it reserved the right to block the implementation of
such actions under either the supremacy or the commerce clause of the
Constitution. 3 The FAA was, and still is, asserting that the extensive
federal role envisioned by congressional legislation should be frag-
mented and accomplished piecemeal by local airport proprietors but,
importantly, with no federal liability.34 Thus, exclusive airport propri-
etor liability exists in the midst of pervasive federal control of aircraft
flight operations.
6. Quiet Communities Act of 1978 and the Aviation Safety and
Noise Abatement Act of 1979
Partially to speed up FAA response to EPA proposals, Congress
further amended section 611 in the Quiet Communities Act of 1978.11
It specified a ninety-day time limit for FAA response to EPA suggested
regulations for noise abatement. It further required the FAA to pro-
vide the public with a detailed analysis and response to the EPA
proposals.
In 1979, Congress continued its march toward pervasive controls
and enacted the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979
(ASNA).36 ASNA required the Secretary of Transportation to estab-
32. Id at 34.
33. See id at 58, in which the FAA discusses its review procedure of airport proprietor
use restrictions. See also U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
34. It is possible that the FAA is reevaluating this position. In a speech given on Febru-
ary 18, 1982, FAA Administrator J. Lynn Helms hinted at this reevaluation when discussing
proposed legislation involving FAA review of local noise regulations:
The FAA, under the bill being drafted, would consider those national conse-
quences and determine if the benefits to the national users from keeping the airport
open for that hour were greater than the costs to the local residents. If so, that hour
will be preserved. The FAA would propose to accept the economic consequences
of such a judgment. That is, the FAA would become liable for the incremental
difference between a reasonable local viewpoint and a truly national perspective.
Address of J. Lynn Helms, 16th Annual Southern Methodist University Air Law Sympo-
sium (Feb. 18, 1982).
35. Quiet Communities Act of 1978 § 3, 49 U.S.C. § 1431(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979). Note
that it took the FAA fifteen months to reject the EPA suggested two-segment approach pro-
cedures. See supra note 30.
36. Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.A.
(West Supp. 1981)).
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lish federal standards for measuring and assessing noise as it impacts
residents near airports.37 Additionally, airport proprietors were made
eligible under the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970 to
obtain federal funds to assist them in airport noise compatibility
planning.3
Interestingly, according to ASNA, airport proprietors may, but are
not required to, submit "noise exposure maps" and "noise compatibil-
ity programs" to the Secretary. 9 The map, if submitted, must set forth
the incompatible land uses existing near the airport as well as the pro-
jected effects of airport operations in 1985. ° The program should list
the measures taken or to be taken to reduce any incompatible noise.
However, after the first map is submitted, the proprietor must report
any changes that create a "substantial new noncompatible use in any
area surrounding [the] airport."'" Importantly, if the Secretary ap-
proves a noise program and allocates funds, the United States Govern-
ment is not "liable for damages resulting from aviation noise by reason
of any action taken by the Secretary or the Administrator of the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration under this section. '42
Again, the negative aspect of liability is apparent. Although Con-
gress excluded federal liability for noise damages related to the ap-
proval of a noise compatibility plan around a federally supported
airport, it failed to address the thorny question of what liability, if any,
an airport proprietor should have for noise damage resulting from the
proprietor's management of its airport. This statutory program could
represent the ultimate "Catch-22" for the airport proprietors who seem
to be in dire need of assistance to protect their dual-faceted interest of
economic survival and airport noise abatement.43
37. 49 U.S.C.A. § 2102 (West Supp. 1981). EPNdB was the standard used by the FAA
to measure aircraft noise. Congress wanted the FAA to establish a standard for assessing the
impact of the noise on the community. See supra note 20.
38. 49 U.S.C.A. § 2104(c)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
39. See id at.§§ 2103(1), 2104(a).
40. 49 U.S.C.A. § 2103(1) (West Supp. 1981). The regulation promulgated to implement
ASNA, 14 C.F.R. § 15, defines incompatible uses in general to include mobile homes,
churches, schools, concert halls, residential properties, and libraries. 46 Fed. Reg. 8,316
(1981).
41. 49 U.S.C.A. § 2103(2) (West Supp. 1981).
42. Id. at § 2104(d).
43. See Burke, Legal Roar Over Jet Noise, Nat'l L.., Dec. 1, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
"It's kind of a Catch-22 situation," said Maureen R. George, chairwoman of
the National Institution of Municipal Law Officers' airport litigation committee.
"The courts are saying that cities have no authority to control noise," she said.
"But on the other hand [some courts] are finding that cities are liable for the dam-
ages coming from that noise."
Id at 10, col. 3-4 (brackets in original).
19811
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B. Federal Funding of 4irport Development
For over thirty-five years Congress has experimented with differ-
ent methods of aiding the aviation industry.' In 1970, finding the air-
port and airway system inadequate to meet the requirements of the
then projected growth in aviation, Congress enacted the Airport and
Airway Development Act of 1970 (AADA)45 as the vehicle for ex-
panding and improving the system. Congress included in the AADA a
provision establishing a ten-year program (1970 through 1980) for in-
creased federal matching grants to airport proprietors for eligible "air-
port development" projects. 46 Eligible projects included construction,
equipment purchases, and land and easement acquisitions related to
improving the safety of airports.47 Significantly, eligible projects didnot
include noise abatement projects.
The FAA, under the direction of the Secretary of Transportation,
was charged with administering this program. Hundreds of millions of
dollars per year were spent on airport development. An Airport and
Airway Trust Fund was established in the United States Treasury, with
revenues derived from various taxes on airport activities, to meet the
obligations incurred under the AADA. 41 At least one-third of the
amount authorized was to be distributed at the discretion of the Secre-
tary of Transportation. In 1973, Congress amended the AADA to in-
crease federal financial assistance to airports and to prohibit the levy of
a "head" tax on aviation passengers by state or local governments; 49 the
latter could have been used by airport proprietors to supplement their
revenues.
In 1976, Congress recognized that aircraft noise was becoming a
44. See, e.g, Federal Airport Act, Pub. L. No. 79-377, 60 Stat. 170 (1946) (repealed
1970).
45. Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 16, 42, 49
U.S.C.).
46. Id at §§ 2, 14 (current versions at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1714 (1976)).
47. Id at § 11(2) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1711(3) (1976)).
48. Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 236 (codified
in scattered sections of 26,49 U.S.C.). The Trust Fund was established by § 208 of the Act.
The users of aviation pay for the program. Trust Fund revenues are received from, among
other sources, an 8% tax on airline tickets. 26 U.S.C. § 4261(a) (1976). However, pursuant
to § 208, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1742 (West 1976 and Supp. 1981), after September 30,
1980 the revenues received from these taxes no longer go into the Trust Fund but remain in
the general fund of the United States Treasury.
49. Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973, § 7(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976). The
purpose of the federal head tax was to ensure both that passengers and air carriers would be
taxed at a uniform rate and that the flow of interstate commerce and the development of air
transportation would not be inhibited by local head taxes. See S. REP. No. 12, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 4, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1434, 1435.
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major problem. 0 It amended the definition of "airport development"
contained in the AADA to include "any acquisition of land or of any
interest therein necessary to ensure that such land is used only for pur-
poses which are compatible with the noise levels of the operation of a
public airport. '51 Thus, airport proprietors were eligible to receive
funds for such projects as the construction of physical barriers, land-
scaping to diminish noise, and the purchase of land for noise attenua-
tion purposes.52 In addition, the 1976 amendment increased the federal
government's matching share of airport development projects for large
airports from 50% to 75%.53
In 1978, Congress authorized the FAA to grant airport proprietors
funds for the development of noise abatementplans around airports.
5 4
In 1980, funding for noise compatibility purposes was expanded. The
FAA received authority to award grants not only for the development
of airport noise compatibility planning studies, but also to make lim-
ited amounts available for those projects approved by the FAA as con-
tained in an approved noise compatibility program.55 Eligible projects
included the construction of barriers and acoustical shielding, sound-
proofing of buildings, and the acquisition of land and air easements for
noise compatibility purposes.56 This funding created the potential for a
greatly expanded program to reduce the amount of noise inflicted on
residents surrounding airports. The program, however, was never fully
developed, primarily because funding for such projects was discontin-
ued when, on September 30, 1980, the ten-year funding program con-
tained in the AADA expired in accordance with its own terms.
57
50. [A]ircraft noise has resulted in curfews and other operational constraints which
have restricted the use of existing facilities, and have caused problems relating to
the safety of the system. Because of noise emanating from the operations at air-
ports, full utilization and expansion of airports to accommodate current and future
traffic have been hampered.
H.R. REP. No. 594, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1600, 1603.
51. Airport and Airway Development Act Amendments of 1976, § 3(a)(1), 49 U.S.C.
§ 1711(3)(C) (1976).
52. H.R. REP. No. 594, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1600, 1613.
53. Airport and Airway Development Act Amendments of 1976, § 9(a), 49 U.S.C.
§ 1717(a) (1976).
54. Quiet Communities Act of 1978, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4913 (Supp. III 1979).
55. Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979, § 104(c), 49 U.S.C.A. § 2104(c)
(West Supp. 1981).
56. Id. at § 2104(a)(3), (5).
57. See Feazel, Airport Aid Delay Until 1981 Expected, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Oct. 13, 1980, at 36. Because of Congress' failure thus far to reinstitute the funding
provisions of the AADA, two of the largest United States Airport Associations recently told
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The legislative history described above clearly illustrates the con-
gressionally created atmosphere of pervasive federal involvement in the
area of aviation noise abatement. Although the federal government
has not totally preempted local proprietors from exercising certain re-
sponsibilities, the FAA's role has certainly been predominant. How-
ever, despite its predominance, the FAA has consistently refused to
accept primary responsibility for noise abatement or any liability for
aircraft noise damages. This refusal has led to extensive litigation over
the powers, rights, and obligations of local airport proprietors. Because
legislative intent in this area is not perfectly clear, and because the
FAA's actions have been below apparent congressional authorization,
the courts have played a major role in attempting to resolve these is-
sues. In that light, this article will leave the partly cloudy world of
legislators and regulators to go to the partly sunny world of
adjudicators.
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Introduction-Room for the Litigious Litigant
Citizens, individually or as a group, may sue an airport proprietor
to recover damages for injuries to property or person resulting from
aircraft noise; they may also seek injunctive relief.5" Moreover, air car-
riers and aviation associations can sue airport proprietors for injunctive
relief to modify or eliminate airport proprietor or local government im-
posed airport use restrictions (e.g., curfews) designed to reduce aircraft
noise.59 Conversely, an airport proprietor can sue an airline or aviation
Congress that a program allowing members to withdraw voluntarily from participation in
the airport development program and impose their own head taxes "must be included in any
final legislative package." 260 AViAmTON DAiLY 165 (1982).
58. For a discussion of "inverse condemnation" and "taking" actions, see Griggs v. Alle-
gheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Luedtke v.
County of Milwaukee, 371 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Wis. 1974), a'd in part, vacated and re-
manded inpart, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975); Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v.
City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 820 (1980); Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Adams v. Couniy of Dade; 355 So. 2d 594 (Dist.
Ct. of App.), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1976); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or.
178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
For cases discussing airport proprietors' potential liability for tortious management, see
Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 371 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Wis. 1974), a17'd inpart, vacated
andremandedinpart, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975); Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n
v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 820 (1980); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Ct., 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136
Cal. Rptr. 557, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
59. See, eg., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (curfew);
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group to enjoin violations of airport proprietary rules designed either to
maintain the current level of airport noise or to reduce it.6" Addition-
ally, an airport proprietor may sue a state or other governing body to
enjoin interference with an airport proprietor's operating rights and
prerogatives.6" Of course, the federal government, through FAA ac-
tion, may sue an airport proprietor to enjoin airport use restrictions
that unduly interfere with both interstate commerce and aircraft flight
operations.62 Finally, any "injured party," most notably airlines or air-
port proprietors, can petition the FAA through the rulemaking process
to carry out its congressional mandate to formulate uniform national
aviation noise operating standards. 63
Embedded in these avenues of relief is a confluence of economic,
governmental, and social interests that will, in combination, influence a
court's decision regarding the key issues of liability and responsibility
for aircraft noise. Court decisions will also be guided by congressional
intent. Accordingly, a review of the major aircraft noise cases should
help to reveal whether the judiciary has left room for the FAA to exer-
cise more affirmatively its noise abatement responsibilities, and
whether maneuvering room is left for judicial interpretation of congres-
sional and administrative intent so as to establish once and for all who
is responsible and who is liable for aviation noise.
B. Airport Proprietors Are Liable for Property Damages
Caused by Aircraft Noise
In the past thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has decided three
British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 588 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977) (supersonic aircraft restric-
tions); British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977); Santa Monica Air-
port Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (night curfew, jet
ban), at'd, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981); National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp.
417 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (curfew); Air Transp. Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(CNEL and SENEL limitations).
60. See, e.g., Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. Hughes Air Corp., No. NC
C 17926B (Super. Ct. County of Los Angeles, filed Feb. 7, 1980).
61. See, e.g., San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal.
1978), aft'd, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981) (this suit was in response to the granting of a
conditional variance by the State of California to an airport operating permit).
62. No recent cases have been filed by the FAA invoking the supremacy or commerce
clause of the Constitution. However, the FAA, through the Justice Department, filed amicus
curiae briefs in Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.
1981) and in San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978),
urging that airport use restrictions be enjoined and intervened in Pacific Southwest Airlines
v. County of Orange, Civil No. 81-3248 TJH (GX), (C.D. Cal. 1981).
63. See, eg., Petition for Rulemaking of the Air Transport Association of America, Air-
port Noise Abatement Plans: Regulatory Process, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,076 (1979).
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aircraft noise cases which constitute the foundation upon which the
lower courts have determined that the airport proprietor is liable for
certain consequences of aircraft noise. These cases are United States v.
Causby,64 Griggs v. Allegheny County,65 and City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal, Inc. 6 6 Interestingly, all three majority opinions
were written by Mr. Justice Douglas.
In Causby, decided in 1946, military aircraft had repeatedly passed
over a chicken farmer's land at an altitude of eighty-three feet. The
noise from these aircraft was sufficient to destroy the residential and
commercial value of the farmer's land. The Supreme Court agreed
with the landowner's contention that his property had been taken by
the federal government (the airport proprietor) without compensation
in violation of the fifth amendment:
67
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the
land, is part of the public domain. We need not determine at
this time what those precise limits are. Flights over private
land are. . . a taking, [if] they are so low and so frequent as
to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment
and use of the land.6"
Causby was not the last word on the parameters of federal liability
for aircraft noise;69 Griggs v. Allegheny County ° extended the general
64. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
65. 69 U.S. 84 (1962).
66. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, which provides in part: "[Nior shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."
68. 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
69. Lower federal courts have applied Causby narrowly. In Batten v. United States, 306
F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963), which also involved military
aircraft, property owners were denied the right to recover damages as a result of noise and
vibrations caused by aircraft that did not invade the plaintifi's airspace or render the prop-
erty uninhabitable. Thus, when the federal government is the airport proprietor, recovery is
permitted for a "taking" only when an aircraft physically invades the property's airspace.
State courts, however, in interpreting the just compensation clauses contained in their
state constitutions, have allowed recovery for less than physical invasion of airspace. See,
e.g., Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). The 4aron court was of the view that physical invasion was
not necessary because aircraft noise is capable of accurate measurement. The court con-
cluded that in California there is a taking if there is a
measurable reduction in market value resulting from the operation of the airport in
such manner that the noise from aircraft using the airport causes a substantial in-
terference with the use and enjoyment of the [adjacent] property, and the interfer-
ence is sufficiently direct and sufficiently peculiar that the [property] owner, if
uncompensated, would pay more than his proper share to the public undertaking.
Id at 484, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 176 (emphasis added).
70. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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concept enunciated in Causby to local airport proprietors via the four-
teenth amendment. In Griggs, the defendant, Allegheny County, oper-
ated the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. The aircraft utilizing the airport
flew so low and near Mr. Griggs' residential property that his family
was forced to move. The Court reasoned that the airport proprietor
was responsible for acquiring sufficient land adjacent to the airport to
reduce the impact of aviation noise and, if it failed to perform that
function, it was liable for the resulting aircraft noise damage to Mr.
Griggs' property because a "constitutional taking" had occurred.71
Justice Douglas set the tone for airport operator liability by stating that
"[r]espondent in designing. . .[the airport] had to acquire some pri-
vate property. Our conclusion is that by constitutional standards it did
not acquire enough."' 72 The airport proprietors, rather than the FAA
or the airlines operating out of the commercial airport, were held liable
for any noise damage.
In a strong dissent, Justice Black, joined by Justice Frankfurter,
urged that because "Congress has over the years adopted a comprehen-
sive plan for national and international air commerce, regulating in
minute detail virtually every aspect of air transit, 73 . it would be unfair
to saddle localities such as Allegheny County with a heavy financial
burden or to throw a "monkey wrench into Congress' finely tuned na-
tional transit mechanism."'74 Thus, even early on, serious dissension
existed within the Supreme Court as to whether local proprietor liabil-
ity was the equitable solution to the aircraft noise problem.
Griggs seems to have a narrow holding that is often soft-pedaled or
ignored: the airport proprietor had the original opportunity to
purchase enough land possibly to prevent the noise damage and, be-
cause it did not, it was liable. The Court's rationale does not indicate
what the result would have been had some damage still resulted from
federally approved flights even though the airport proprietor had done
all that reasonably could have been done to prevent noise damage.
Under what fact pattern would the Court have absolved the proprietor
yet held the federal government liable?
C Municipalities Are Preemptedfrom Imposing Airport Use
Restrictions--Or Are They?
Eleven years after Griggs, the Supreme Court decided City of Bur-
71. Id at 89-90.
72. Id at 90.
73. .d at 91 (Black, J., dissenting).
74. Id at 94.
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bank v. LockheedAir Terminal, Inc. 75 In 1970, the City of Burbank,
through exercise of its police powers, enacted an ordinance establishing
an 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. curfew on jet aircraft operations at the then
privately owned Hollywood-Burbank Airport. The airport operator
sued for an injunction against the enforcement of the Burbank ordi-
nance. After reviewing the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, the Noise Control Act of 1972, and the regulations enacted pursu-
ant to them, the Supreme Court held the ordinance to be an impermis-
sible intrusion into a federally preempted area.76 Justice Douglas,
again writing for the Court, stated that the Noise Control Act of 1972
"reaffirms and reinforces the conclusion that the FAA, now in conjunc-
tion with the EPA, has full control over aircraft noise,pre-empling state
andlocalcontrol."'77 Justice Douglas continued by observing that while
the "[c]ontrol of noise is of course deep-seated in the police powers of
the States .... [t]he pervasive control vested in EPA and in FAA
under the 1972 Act seems to us to leave no room for local curfews or
other local controls.""8
The Burbank Court did not set forth "the ultimate remedy.., for
aircraft noise which plagues many communities and tens of thousands of
people."7 9 However, it hinted that the remedy might be found in the
procedures adopted in accordance with the Noise Control Act of 1972
and in the procedures involved in the implementation of various rules
and regulations relating to the control of aircraft noise. The Court
noted that the Administrator of the FAA had already imposed regula-
tions relating to takeoff and landing procedures, runway preferences,
and noise standards which aircraft must meet as a condition to type
certification. 0 Moreover, "[a]ny regulations adopted by the Adminis-
trator to control noise pollution must be consistent with the 'highest
degree of safety.' "81 The interdependence of these factors, the Court
concluded, "requires a uniform and exclusive system of federal regula-
tion if the congressional objectives underlying the Federal Aviation Act,
are to be fulfilled."' 2 Thus, the rationale for the Burbank decision is
that the delicate balance between aircraft safety and efficiency man-
75. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
76. Id at 638.
77. Id at 633 (emphasis added).
78. Id at 638 (emphasis added).
79. Id (emphasis added).
80. Id
81. Id at 639 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1431(d)(3)).
82. 411 U.S. at 638. Justice Douglas wrote that a municipality cannot control the hours
of operation of an airport through its police powers, i.e., impose a curfew. Id
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dated by the Federal Aviation Act requires a uniform and exclusive
system of federal regulation.
Burbank seemed to offer a simple point of law: the federal govern-
ment's control over aviation noise abatement is pervasive and preemp-
tive. It would have remained a simple case had the Court used only
thirteen footnotes. Justice Douglas' footnote 14,83 however, hinted that
an airport proprietor might have power to regulate the use of its airport
that a nonproprietor municipality did not have. The issue was not re-
solved because it was not before the Court.84 Footnote 14, though po-
litely hidden, turned out to be a dormant volcano waiting to erupt.
D. The "Proprietor Exception" to Preemption-Airport Proprietors
Have Limited Power
Notwithstanding the lack of specific Supreme Court recognition,
there has been legislative, executive, and judicial reliance on what has
become known as the "proprietor exception" to Burbank's preemption
decision.8" Such reliance has created a legal anomaly. 6 Because fed-
eral preemption was the basis for striking down the curfew in Burbank,
one could hardly believe that Congress would accept an airport propri-
etor's tinkering with the national transportation system, but not accept
83. Footnote 14 provides:
The letter from the Secretary of Transportation also expressed the view that
"the proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State or local public agency,
as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing regulations or establishing require-
ments as to the permissible level of noise which can be created by aircraft using the
airport. Airport owners acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of their
airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such exclusion is
nondiscriminatory." This portion as well was quoted with approval in the Senate
Report.
Appellants and the Solicitor General submit that this indicates that a munici-
pality with jurisdiction over an airport has the power to impose a curfew on the
airport, notwithstanding federal responsibility in the area. But, we are concerned
here not with an ordinance imposed by the City of Burbank as "proprietor" of the
airport, but with the exercise of police power. While the Hollywood-Burbank Air-
port may be the only major airport which is privately owned, many airports are
owned by one municipality yet physically located in another. For example, the
principal airport serving Cincinnati is located in Kentucky. Thus, authority that a
municipality may have as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with its police
power. We do not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a
proprietor.
Id at 635 n.14 (emphasis in original).
84. Id
85. Seegenerall Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927,
932 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aft'd, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981); Brief of the United States of
America, Amicus Curiae, Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, id; Brief of
the United States of America, Amicus Curiae, San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco,
457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978), af'd, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981).
86. Air Transp. Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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a sovereign state or political subdivision's intrusion. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court, to validate such an interpretation, would have had to
conclude that the il-effects of a curfew imposed by a proprie-
tor/municipality are acceptable, while the ill-effects of a curfew im-
posed by a nonproprietor/municipality are not.87 Unfortunately,
though the Supreme Court clearly decided the specific preemption is-
sue in Burbank, it left somewhat of a "sticky wicket" in its wake, partic-
ularly the controversy regarding proprietor/municipality powers.
An objective view of Burbank suggests that the Supreme Court
knew exactly what it was doing: placing limits on local interference
with federal management of the airspace-be the interferer a propri-
etor or nonproprietor. The Supreme Court accepts cases because of
their national import. It may be beyond credibility that the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Burbank to reach a decision that would ap-
ply solely to Hollywood-Burbank Airport, the only privately owned
major airport in the United States. Consequently, footnote 14 might
well be the latest in a long list of convenient "red herrings." '
The Causby, Griggs, and Burbank decisions have established a
classic confrontation, and their progeny reflect the resulting confusion.
While Griggs represents proprietor liability in the midst of a sea of fed-
eral regulatory actions, Burbank represents federal preemption in the
midst of a sea of locally imposed airport use restrictions. Can the two
principles coexist?
An early test came in Air Transport Association v. Crotti,8 9 where
the Air Transport Association sought a determination of whether air-
87. In discussing the effects of a curfew along with the FAA's position, the Supreme
Court pointed out that according to the testimony at trial, the increased congestion and
inefficiency brought on by Burbank-type curfews would aggravate the noise problem. See
411 U.S. at 627-28.
88. This view was supported by the EPA in a 1973 study:
However, the Supreme Court does not note probable jurisdiction and affirm a
case such as Burbank unless a substantial Federal question is presented. If after
noting probable jurisdiction, the Court finds that the appellant [sic] constitute a
class of one or two and that no broad question is therefore presented, the case will
be dismissed. When the Court affirms with a precedent setting opinion it "must"
have believed that state and local government owned airports could be included
within the preemption rationale .... Nothing in the opinion explicitly suggests
the foregoing except that, with an exception or two, all air carrier airports are
owned by states or political subdivisions thereof. If all such airports can be
curfewed by their owners as owners, the Burbank opinion means very little.
Brief for Plaintiff/Appellant and Plaintiffs-Intervenors/Appellants, Santa Monica Airport
Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Aircraft/Airport Noise Report-Legal and Institutional Analysis of Aircraft
and Airport Noise Apportionment of Authority Between Federal, State and Local Govern-
ment, at 2-46 (July 27, 1973)).
89. 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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lines were subject to California's aircraft noise standards.9" In answer,
a three-judge district court opined that because Griggs established that
airport proprietors are responsible for damage to private property as a
result of aircraft using their facilities, the proprietors have a concomi-
tant right to control the use of their airports.9 In addition, the court
used footnote 14 to support its decision that such airport proprietor ac-
tion is an exception to the preemption rule of Burbank.92 Thus, the
Griggs-supported rationale enabled the court to sustain a public air-
port's right to select the type of air service it desires.93 The court held
that California's use of Community Noise Equivalent Levels (CNELs)
as a standard for measuring aircraft noise was not per se invalid as an
90. In 1969, the California Legislature enacted legislation directing the State Depart-
ment of Aeronautics (now the Department of Transportation) to adopt noise standards for
airports operating under a state permit. CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE §§ 21669-21669.4 (West
Supp. 1981). Pursuant to this statutory authorization, the Department subsequently adopted
"noise standards." 21 CAL. ADMiN. CODE §§ 5000-5080.5 (1979).
These standards seek to achieve a gradual reduction in the amount of noise generated
by aircraft takeoffs and landings at California airports. They establish what is known as a
Community Noise Equivalent Level (CNEL). CNEL provides a method for computing on a
24-hour basis an average noise exposure leveL A cumulative analysis (e.g., nighttime opera-
tions are penalized ten times) takes into account the total noise generated by aircraft
"events" over a given period of time. In graduated steps, no airport is to have a "noise
impact boundary" containing an "incompatible land use" in excess of 65dB on the CNEL
scale by 1985.
The CNEL standards require an airport operator to operate its airport so as not to
exceed the applicable CNEL noise level 21 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 5062 (1979). An operator
unable to comply with the noise standards may apply to the Department for a variance. 21
CAL. ADMiN. CODE § 5075 (1979). As a practical matter, the noise standards are so stringent
that all of the major airports in California-including those at Los Angeles, San Francisco,
San Jose, Burbank, San Diego, and Ontario, as well as John Wayne Airport in Orange
County-must apply on an annual basis for a variance as a matter of routine. Feit, Experts
Expect Noise To Worsen As More Jets Use Ontario leirort, The Sun (Ontario, Cal.), June 3,
1981 at B7, coL 2.
91. See 389 F. Supp. at 63-64.
92. Id at 63. The court stated:
We believe that the Airlines' total reliance on Burbank is misplaced. The fac-
tual picture supporting Burbank is of narrow focus, a single police power ordi-
nance of a municipality-not an airport proprietor-intending to abate aircraft
noise byforbidding aircraft flight at certain night hours. The holding in Burbank is
limited to that proscription as constituting an unlawful exercise of police power in
a field pre-empted by the federal government, and we take as gospel the words in
footnote 14 in Burbank: "[A]uthority that a municipality may have as a landlord is
not necessarily congruent with its police power. We do not consider here what lim-
its, if any, appiy to a municoali y as aproprietor."
Id (emphasis in original).
93. Id at 63-64. Perhaps Crotti is not the final verdict for California's CNEL methodol-
ogy. In San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978), ai'd,
651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981), a district court found that California's attempt to condition
the granting of a variance from its CNEL requirement for the operation of the San Diego
airport was a nonproprietary regulation prohibited by Burbank See infra note 132.
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invasion of a federally preempted area.94 However, the same court also
cited Burbank to strike down California's Single Event Noise Exposure
Levels (SENELs) because the use of this standard was an attempt to
regulate "noise levels occurring when an aircraft is in direct flight
[which is an unlawful intrusion] into the exclusive federal domain of
control over aircraf flights and operations. 95
If liability follows responsibility, the Crotil decision suggests two
propositions: first, airport proprietors are liable for damage that they
can control (noise from an aircraft while on the ground at the airport
and possibly noise that could be excluded by preventing or limiting air
service); and, second, the federal government preempts airport proprie-
tor liability for noise damage that the proprietor cannot control (air-
craft in flight). However, Crotli did not go the "extra mile" because it
said nothing about federal liability for noise damages caused by air-
craft while under FAA control in the air.96
The culprit is Burbank; it left some "daylight" for proprietor-
initiated restrictions on airport use that were ultimately supported in
principle by the FAA in its 1976 Noise Policy and in other pronounce-
ments.97 Courts could then use congressional vagueness, executive in-
terpretations, and judicial dicta to support an exception to the Burbank
preemption rule. But that is not always such an easy task, and one
court's difficulty was aptly expressed by Judge Peckham in National
Aviation v. City of Hayward:98
Thus, this court finds itself caught on the horns of a par-
ticularly sharp dilemma: If on one hand, we follow the dicta
94. 389 F. Supp. at 64-65. The court left for another day the decision of whether the
CNEL provisions were invalid as actually applied. Id at 65.
95. Id at 65.
96. Although the Croal court viewed CNEL as a legitimate manner of measuring and
regulating noise near airports, in a recent speech FAA Administrator J. Lynn Helms reached
a contrary conclusion. According to Mr. Helms, the FAA is drafting legislation to require
FAA approval of local restrictions on airport noise. Specifically addressing California's use
of this CNEL concept, Mr. Helms commented that "unrealistic California noise standards
will either shut down significant segments of the air transportation industry or create com-
promises on safety." Helms continued, "Clearly, the California noise laws are putting such
pressures on the airport operators that the operators are seeking solutions which make trade-
offs between noise and safety." Finally, the FAA Administrator considered that such meas-
ures "could cripple our air transportation system and stifle this nation's continued economic
development." See Stales Airport Noise Rules Called Too Strict, Los Angeles Times, Feb.
19, 1982 at 20, col. 4. Query: Would a requirement of prior approval by the FAA of all local
aircraft noise regulations represent the final link in the chain leading to absolute preemption,
thus insulating airport proprietors from nuisance liability?
97. See NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note I, at 34.
98. 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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in footnote 14 of the Burbank opinion, which is intended to
comport with the court's holding in Griggs, we will severely
undercut the rationale of Burbank's finding of preemption. If
on the other hand, we disregard the proprietor exception as
dicta in order to fully effectuate the Burbank rationale, we im-
pose upon airport proprietors the responsibility under Griggs
for obtaining the requisite noise easements, yet deny them the
authority to control the level of noise produced at their
airports.99
Hayward involved an action brought by four airplane operators at
the Hayward Municipal Airport, a noncommercial airport, to declare
unconstitutional an ordinance enacted in the City's capacity as airport
proprietor. The ordinance prohibited aircraft exceeding certain noise
levels from taking off between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. In harmonizing Bur-
bank and Crotti, the court held that preemption did not forbid the en-
forcement of the Hayward ordinance. In the court's view, Congress
intended only to preclude a municipal authority that was not an airport
proprietor from enacting police power regulations regarding airport
noise. It did not intend to preclude an airport proprietor from taking
steps to exclude aircraft on the basis of noise considerations. 1
The court also found that there was insufficient evidence to con-
clude that the Hayward ordinance did more than "incidentally" burden
interstate commerce. Moreover, the court viewed, as mere speculation,
the possibility that other airport proprietors might adopt similar ordi-
nances, which together would create an impermissible burden."'
Hayward did not resolve the liability/responsibility dilemma be-
cause Judge Peckham seemed to be searching for total preemption,
which, of course, he did not find. The decision, however, implies that
Congress and the FAA could take charge and preempt most local noise
abatement efforts while simultaneously curtailing expensive litiga-
tion.102 Also, the FAA could more clearly establish the acceptable lim-
its of locally imposed use restrictions. However, because neither the
99. Id at 424.
100. Id at 424-25.
101. Id at 428.
102. Judge Peckham was not the only judge to suggest the potential for federal preemp-
tion. Justice Rehnquist did the same in his dissent in Burbank:
Clearly Congress could pre-empt the field to local regulation if it chose, and very
likely the authority conferred on the Administrator of FAA by 49 U.S.C. § 1431 is
sufficient to authorize him to promulgate regulations effectively pre-empting local
action. But neither Congress nor the Administrator has chosen to go that route.
411 U.S. at 653 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Crotti nor the Hayward court found sufficient evidence of preemption,
it was left for another day and another court to determine Congress'
intent in this area.
Such a day came when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the Concorde landing rights issue in British Airways Board v.
Port Authority (Concorde ) 103 and British Airways Board v. Port Au-
thority (Concorde II).1 4 In these cases, the Port Authority of New
York tried to ban the operation of the Concorde at John F. Kennedy
Airport after the United States Secretary of Transportation had or-
dered a sixteen-month operational test to consider the feasibility and
desirability of supersonic transport service to selected American air-
ports. In two separate opinions, the court acknowledged that both air-
port proprietors and the FAA have a stake in airport noise abatement
but that there were significant limitations to proprietary actions as well
as to the degree of federal preemption.10 5 Accordingly, the court recog-
nized and accepted an implied sharing of responsibility. It noted that
"Congress repeatedly has declined to alter this cooperative
scheme. . . . [T]he legislative history clearly states that the statute [the
Federal Aviation Act] was merely intended to strengthen the FAA's
regulatory role within the area already totally preempted--control of
flights through navigable airspace." 1°6 While recognizing that the FAA
had broad executive powers, the court in Concorde I observed that "the
Supreme Court [in Burbank] has refrained from holding that Congress
has occupied the field of noise regulation to the exclusion of airport
proprietors."'' 7 Thus, airport proprietors can impose use restrictions.
However, according to the court, an airport proprietor is subject to two
important constitutional restrictions: first, proprietor-imposed noise
regulations must not create an undue burden on interstate or foreign
commerce; second, such restrictions may not unjustly discriminate be-
tween different categories of airport users.'08
While it is easy to speak of congressional intent and two-tiered
responsibility, it is much more difficult to discuss two-tiered liability.
In fact, after all its in-depth reading of federal statutory schemes, the
Second Circuit did not even hint that the federal government could or
should be liable for any noise damages it might have caused. If there is
103. 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
104. 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
105. 558 F.2d at 83; 564 F.2d at 1010-11.
106. 558 F.2d at 83-84 (footnote omitted).
107. Id at 84.
108. Id
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no federal liability, can pervasive federal presence shield the airport
proprietor from liability for noise damage?
E. Airport Proprietor Personal Injury Liability-A Split Decision
That question can be addressed by examining San Diego Un/fed
Port District v. Superior Court,"0 9 in which the court denied an attempt
by a group of noise-distressed residents to recover nuisance damages
from an airport proprietor because the federal government controlled
the flight of the airplanes. In San Diego, the plaintiff homeowners sued
under nuisance and negligence theories, claiming that the airport pro-
prietor had failed to enact adequate regulations, such as a curfew, for
the control of noise. The court used federal preemption to shield the
airport proprietor from liability. 110 It reasoned that because a
non airport proprietor could not impose a curfew, neither could an air-
port proprietor. In the court's view, the impact of the curfew remained
the same-congestion and interference with flight schedules."' The
Port District, according to the court, did not have the authority to im-
pose a curfew and thus could not be liable for failing to do what it was
not authorized to do." 2 No mention was made, however, of federal
liability. Interestingly, the court indicated that the supremacy clause,
the basis for preemption, would not shield the proprietor from liability
for tortious mismanagement of those noise abatement aspects under its
control. 13 Although this court did shield the proprietor from one as-
pect of liability, the principle of shared responsibility was basically
reinforced.
It is an understatement that airport proprietors would rather not
have the distinction of being the sole entity liable for aircraft noise.
However, to date, but for a few exceptions,' 4 that distinction has been
109. 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
110. Id at 376, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
111. Id at 368, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 561. The court of appeal, in referring to the proprietor
exemption theory, doubted that the United States Supreme Court intended that municipali-
ties could do as proprietors what they were forbidden to do under the cloak of the police
power.
112. Id at 376, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
113. d at 377, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
114. See Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 371 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Wis. 1974), affdin
part, vacated and remanded in part, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975); San Diego Unified Port
Dist. v. Superior Ct., 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859
(1977).
In Luedke, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to permit residents
who were aggrieved by aircraft noise from seeking, among other remedies, nuisance dam-
ages under Wisconsin law. The court stated:
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honored. In two 1974 cases, 5 the City of Los Angeles attempted to
pass noise damage liability to air carriers, manufacturers, and the fed-
eral government. The courts, however, concluded that the airport pro-
prietor was solely liable for failure to acquire air easements."16
The city's fortunes remained poor when a group of homeowners
adjacent to Los Angeles International Airport sued to recover for inju-
ries from aircraft noise. In Greater Westchester Homeowners Associa-
tion v. City ofLos Angeles,1 7 the plaintiffs sought damages under both
inverse condemnation and nuisance theories. The California Supreme
Court rejected the city's claim of federal preemption, concluding that
no federal shield existed to insulate the airport proprietor from tort
damages. After an exhaustive study of congressional intent, federal
and state case law, and FAA regulatory actions, the court determined
that neither Congress nor the FAA expressly precluded either local
noise abatement actions or concomitant state remedies for personal in-
jury awards arising out of an inverse condemnation suit."18 Moreover,
Since the federal laws and regulations have preempted local control of aircraft
flights, Burbank, supra, the defendants may not, to the extent they comply with
such federal laws and regulations, be charged with negligence or creating a nui-
sance. Similarly, § 114.04 of the Wisconsin Statutes cannot be invoked to make
unlawful flights which are in accordance with federal laws and regulations. If, as
the plaintiffs allege, the aircraft flights have resulted in the "taking" of their prop-
erty, the plaintiffs have actions at law to recover just compensation from the
County. Griggs, supra .... To the extent that the County may be violating the
federal laws or regulations, the plaintiffs should. . . exhaust their administrative
remedies.
521 F.2d at 391.
115. City of Los Angeles v. Japan Airlines Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 416, 116 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1974) (city as owner-operator of Los Angeles International Airport liable because Califor-
nia statute provided a mechanism for city to acquire air easements; absent contractual agree-
ments or legislative mandate, air carriers did not have to indemnify city); Aaron v. City of
Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162, cer. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1974)
(federal control of navigable airspace no defense for airport proprietor's failure to purchase
adequate air easements-as held in Griggs).
116. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 428-29, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 7.8; 40 Cal. App. 3d at 486-87, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 172-73.
117. 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
(1980).
118. Id at 100, 603 P.2d at 1336, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739. In a concurring opinion, Chief
Justice Bird disagreed with the majority's reliance upon inverse condemnation law to sup-
port its holding that federal legislation had not preempted the aviation noise abatement
field. Id. at 104-05, 603 P.2d at 1339, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 742-43 (Bird, C.J., concurring). She
argued that the city was liable because of its failure to take actions, such as construction of
ground barriers or soundproofing of homes, to reduce airport noise. These actions, the
Chief Justice noted, would have been within the spirit of, and consistent with, federal and
state laws. Id at 108, 603 P.2d at 1340, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
Chief Justice Bird's concurring opinion suggests the possibility that had the proprietor
done all it could, it may have been absolved of liability. Id at 108, 603 P.2d at 1340-41, 160
Cal. Rptr. at 744. Furthermore, her statement that "federal regulations cannot preempt con-
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the court believed that airport proprietors had the power to limit their
liability under Griggs because Congress had preserved proprietary con-
trol over airport design, planning, and use.119 This limited power of
airport proprietors to impose certain controls doomed them. After
finding "no appellate agreement on the scope of the so-called 'proprie-
tor exception' to the federal preemption rule [of Burbank] and its effect
on the tortious liability of airports,"12 the California Supreme Court
121
found no basis for federal preemption of personal damage awards.
122
stitutionally protected rights," id at 105, 603 P.2d at 1339, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 742, implies that
perhaps the federal government should be jointly liable for inverse condemnation damages.
119. Id at 97, 603 P.2d at 1334, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
120. Id at 96, 603 P.2d at 1333-34, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
121. Id at 100, 603 P.2d at 1336, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739. The city's argument for preemp-
tion was as follows: (1) Burbank provides that a nonairport proprietor cannot regulate air-
craft noise, (2) the State of California is a nonairport proprietor, (3) the award of tort
damages is a form of regulation, and, therefore, (4) the State of California is preempted from
imposing tort damages on an airport proprietor.
Authority for the proposition that the award of tort damages is a form of regulation is
found in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, held that because it was arguable that
certain union activities involved in that case fell within the ambit of the "concerted activi-
ties" or the "unfair labor practice" provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, state
jurisdiction to award tort damages was preempted. Concerning this issue, Justice Frank-
furter wrote:
Nor is it significant that California asserted its power to give damages rather
than to enjoin what the Board may restrain though it could not compensate. Our
concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be free from state regula-
tion if national policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation can be as effec-
tively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive
relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a
potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. Even the States' salu-
tary effort to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm cannot be
exerted to regulate activities that are potentially subject to the exclusive federal
regulatory scheme. [citations omitted]. It may be that an award of damages in a
particular situation will not, in fact, conflict with the active assertion of federal
authority. The same may be true of the incidence of a particular state injunction.
To sanction either involves a conflict with federal policy in that it involves allowing
two law-making sources to govern.
Id at 246-47.
122. No longer can it be asserted that this problem is isolated to the peculiar proclivities
of California tort law. Fomented by Greater Westchester, the state of Georgia has aligned
itself with California in a case almost identical to it. In Owen v. City of Atlanta, 157 -Ga.
App. 354, 122 S.E.2d 338 (1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3916 (U.S. May 12, 1982), the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the City of Atlanta, as proprietor of Hartsfield Atlanta
International Airport, was subject to state tort liability because residents in the vicinity of
the airport were allegedly injured by noise emanating from aircraft using its airport.
Other courts are also taking the precepts enunciated in Greater Westchester seriously.
n a recent small claims case heard in South San Francisco Municipal Court, for example, a
judge awarded 150 residents $750.00 each because they were annoyed by aircraft noise near
San Francisco International Airport. Most troubling are Judge Duncan's reasons for award-
ing the damages. He appeared particularly disturbed that the airport proprietor had neither
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Not only are there noise problems in Burbank and San Diego, but
in Santa Monica as well. In Santa Moniea Airport Association v. City of
Santa Monica,2 3 a federal district court upheld, inter alia, a proprietor-
imposed night departure curfew and the use of a SENEL standard
while striking down the airport's total ban on jet aircraft. 12 4 Judge Hill
upheld the night departure curfew and the 100 dBA SENEL despite
commerce clause, equal protection, and supremacy clause arguments
from the plaintiffs, Santa Monica Airport Association, and plaintiffs-
intervenors, National Business Aircraft Association and General Avia-
tion Manufacturers Association.
25
One interesting aspect of the Santa Monica case concerns the is-
sues of federal preemption and implied liability. The FAA, in its ami-
cus brief, urged the court to hold the SENEL unconstitutional because
it invaded a federally preempted area. The FAA justified this conclu-
sion by arguing that Congress had intended that the FAA control all
matters affecting aircraft in flight2 6 and that because pilots try to "beat
the meter" which measures the single noise event, the SENEL "affects
aircraft in flight" and is thus preempted. Despite the FAA's explicit
advancement of federal preemption, Judge Hill upheld the Santa
Monica SENEL. To do so, Judge Hill implicitly must have found
Santa Monica potentially subject to Griggs-type liability in order to
permit it to go so far as to limit its liability by imposing a SENEL.
Thus, the question raised is whether the local proprietor or the federal
government should have Griggs-type liability for noise damages result-
ing from aircraft in flight.
All of this remains rather perplexing because neither the judiciary
nor Congress has adequately dealt with the subject of liability. The
FAA, interpreting the federal role, has acknowledged that "although
many aspects of the aircraft noise problem are appropriate for local
control, the range of remedial measures available to the airport propri-
etor has been somewhat limited by the exercise of the paramount au-
adopted a limited curfew nor prohibited the noisiest aircraft. See Workmen, Residents Win
$750 Each in S.F Jet Noise Case, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 23, 1982 at 1, col. 1.
Judge Hill is not the only one who is on the "horns of a particularly sharp dilemma."
NationalAviation, 418 F. Supp. at 424. Should the airport proprietor take the initiative and
impose strict noise regulations en route to being second-guessed by the FAA, or do some-
thing in between and be second-guessed by judge and jury? The airport proprietor must
walk a fine line.
123. 481 F. Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aft'd, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981).
124. See id at 938-39, 941, 943.
125. Id at 935.
126. See Brief of the United States of America, Amicus Curiae, at 10-20, Santa Monica
Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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thority of the United States to regulate commerce." 127
One point seems clear, however. If airport proprietors are eventu-
ally shackled with sole liability for property damages and personal in-
juries resulting from aircraft noise, they will, in self-preservation,
devise airport use restrictions with only their local interests in mind,
thus destroying the hope for a uniform national air transportation
system.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS-THE SEARCH FOR SMOOTH AIR
To say the least, it is not an easy task to summarize this complex
subject and to fashion simple recommendations. Exploration of the
major congressional acts dealing with aviation noise and discussion of
the myriad of relevant court opinions reveal that a heated controversy
exists over whether the FAA should be the country's leading proponent
for ensuring a coordinated effort to reduce aircraft noise.
While the FAA is perfectly willing to share responsibility, on its
own terms, it, along with Congress, dreads the thought that the federal
government should help pay for the current shortcomings in the na-
tional aircraft noise abatement effort. Moreover, the courts have sup-
ported the federal government's position and have made airport
proprietors the scapegoat for damages caused by aviation noise. As a
result of the courts' refusal to place a portion of the liability on the
federal government, airport proprietors face the unenviable honor of
being solely liable for potentially unlimited damages, even though they
have only limited rights to impose use restrictions to minimize aviation
noise.
Not only does this shared responsibility/sole liability scheme im-
pose liability on the least likely candidates-those with the least
financial resources, the least power, and the least knowledge-it is in-
herently unfair. The remaining portion of this article will discuss two
alternative approaches that would more equitably apportion the cost of
reducing aircraft noise and the payment of noise damages.
A. The Federal Government Should Share Liability
The federal government should accept liability for the aviation
noise damages caused by situations under its control, such as aircraft in
flight. Alternatively, the courts should impose liability on the federal
government if it refuses to accept such liability.
This shared responsibility/shared liability approach would reflect
127. Id
19811
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-the divisions within the aviation noise abatement effort. The airport
proprietor's sphere of influence in the noise abatement field generally
encompasses airport site location and design, adequate zoning and pro-
curement of air easements, fair and reasonable access to the airport,
and management of ground facilities. Conversely, the federal govern-
ment's role encompasses noise abatement actions related to quieter en-
gines, aircraft operational procedures and flight patterns, review and
approval of local use restrictions, and management of the air traffic
control system.128 Airport proprietors should be liable only for the avi-
ation noise damages they actually cause or fail to prevent. In turn, the
FAA should be held proportionately liable for aviation noise damages
caused by situations over which it has control. 129 This division is simi-
lar to a comparative negligence approach.
The judiciary must be made aware that there exists a rationale for
a shared responsibility/shared liability approach. For this concept to
become a reality, Griggs would not have to be overturned per se. It
simply must be viewed in the context of present--day conditions.
Griggs was decided in 1962, well before the enactment of most of the
airport noise legislation that has been reviewed. A fresh look would
reveal that the federal government's involvement in this area has be-
come pervasive. The CAB certifies airlines for economic fitness; the
FAA certifies airlines, airports, and airplanes, and controls he flight of
aircraft from the clouds to the runway. The federal government should
be liable if it has "pervasive control" of the situation but fails to fulfill
its responsibility to reduce or avoid aviation noise damage. 30 Rather
than being detrimental to the national interest, shared liability would
prompt the federal government to take a more assertive role in the ef-
fort to reduce aircraft noise.
Congress may not have intended complete federal preemption, but
128. NoisE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note 1, at 5.
129. The Air Transport Association (ATA) has argued that the imposition of liability on
the FAA is preferable to the strangulation of the national air transportation network by a
maze of locally imposed airport use restrictions. For example, in a recent petition to the
FAA urging it to adopt noise abatement rules, the ATA discussed federal responsibility and
potential liability:
[E]ven if the courts... determine that liability should attach to the Federal Gov-
erinent by virtue of the FAA's affirmation and assertion of federal preemption, it
would be a small price to pay to prevent uncoordinated and unilateral restrictions
at varius [sic] airports from working separatedly [sic], or in combination, to endan-
ger the maintenance, promotion and development of the national air transporta-
tion system.
44 Fed. Reg. 52,076, 52,081 (1979).
130. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226,232 (E.D.N.Y.
1967), aft'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
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neither has it discouraged shared liability. The legislators probably
were unaware that airport proprietors would be saddled with complete
liability for the failures of the federal government. Yet the FAA con-
tinues to imply, not necessarily in specific terms, that the only way for
the federal government to assume any liability would be for it to as-
sume complete preemptory status. 131  However, the FAA has not ex-
plained why its liability cannot coexist with airport proprietors'
liability. Room exists for compromise, but the FAA has chosen an all
or nothing approach. The consequence of this position is that federal
leadership in aviation noise abatement is being stifled because of a fear
of liability.132
131. See NoisE ABATEMENT PoLICY, supra note 1, at 34, where the FAA magnanimously
proclaims:
Our concept of the legal framework underlying this policy statement is that propri-
etors retain the flexibility to impose such restrictions if they do not violate any
Constitutional proscription. We have been urged to undertake-and have consid-
ered carefully and rejected-full and complete federal preemption of the field of
aviation noise abatement. In our judgment the control and reduction of airport
noise must remain a shared responsibility among airport proprietors, users, and
governments.
132. The federal presence, or lack thereof, in the form of active leadership in aviation
noise abatement, is an interesting adjunct to another California case, San Diego Unified
Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978), aft'd, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.
1981). The California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) conditioned its grant of a
CNEL noise variance to the Port District for its operation of Lindbergh Field on the Dis-
trict's extension of its voluntary curfew from six to eight hours. Id at 286. After receiving
the variance from CalTrans, the Port District sued for injunctive and declaratory relief on
the ground that the "curfew condition" was unconstitutional because it invaded a field pre-
empted by the federal government. Id at 286-88. The district court found that CalTrans'
attempt to extend San Diego's curfew was a nonproprietor regulation of an airport prohib-
ited by Burbank, id at 292, and granted the Port District's application for a preliminary
injunction. Id at 295.
While the court's decision was clear, the FAA's conduct in this case is not easily under-
stood. Before Judge Schwartz heard the merits of the case, he ruled that the Port District
was required to exhaust its administrative remedies by complying with a CalTrans request
that it seek FAA review of the curfew extension. Id at 286 n.1. However, after being pro-
vided with full background information on the issue by all the parties, the FAA announced
that "it would not provide any response and that no written statement concerning its review
would be forthcoming." Id at 287. The FAA's refusal to respond clearly violated its 1976
Noise Abatement Policy which encouraged such requests. See Noise ABATEMENT POLICY,
supra note 1, at 59.
One additional point stands out. When San Diego originally established the voluntary
night curfew in 1975, the FAA "expressed the 'hope' that Port District would suspend the
night restriction pending completion of the FAA's efforts to develop a noise policy under
which all parties concerned could move together in a comprehensive nationwide noise
abatement program," and that while the FAA would publish the curfew it "would not 'deny
take-off or landing clearances' because to do so might give the. appearance of tacit approval
of the restriction by FAA." Brief for United States of America, Amicus Curiae, at 11, San
Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978). Yet when the Port
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The entire aviation community depends upon an integrated, com-
prehensive, and safe national air transportation system. The traveling
public and airport neighbors want a safe system too, but they also
would appreciate a quieter environment. Consequently, no party can
or should be permitted to shirk its responsibilities or hide from its lia-
bilities. Unless some positive national leadership is assumed by the
FAA, all hopes for maintaining a modicum of order and for avoiding
potential systemwide chaos will be dashed.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately may resolve the responsi-
bility/liability issue, continuous resort to the courtroom is not the most
efficient way to run a national air transportation system. It is time for
federal authorities, within constitutional limits, not only to take charge
but also to assume their liability, if necessary, through appropriate
legislation.
B. An Aviation Noise Abatement Trust Fund
If the shared responsibility/sole liability concept persists, airport
proprietors will continue to incur judgments for the diminution in
value of private property and, in some jurisdictions, for the personal
injury damages caused by noise emanating from aircraft utilizing their
facilities. In response, airport proprietors will continue and, perhaps,
increase their efforts to promulgate noise abatement programs designed
to reduce their liability exposure. These efforts, which may include the
institution of curfews, jet bans, prohibitions against all but Part 36 air-
craft or limitations on service, will be parochial in nature.133 Little ef-
fort will be exerted to consider their impact on the nation's air
transportation system. As a result, Congress' attempt to achieve a uni-
form national transportation system will be thwarted.
What else might be done to prevent the balkanization of the air
transportation system? One option is the creation of a program that
District asked the FAA for advice, three years after the FAA had published its Noise Abate-
ment Policy, the FAA refused to respond.
133. Examples of completed or proposed airport use restrictions by airport proprietors to
reduce aircraft noise include: (I) Nighttime operating restrictions (Lindbergh Field, San
Diego, California; Pearl Harbor, Oahu; Washington National, Washington, D.C.), (2) total
jet ban (Santa Monica Municipal Airport, California; Watertown Municipal Airport, Wis-
consin), (3) excluding non-Part 36 aircraft (Los Angeles International, Logan International,
Boston), (4) limiting the number of aircraft operations (Stewart Airport, New York), (5)
excluding particular types of aircraft (Los Angeles International and Logan International
have prohibited SSTs), (6) limiting number of nighttime operations (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), (7) operational noise limits (JFK International), (8) displaced threshold (Logan Inter-
national and many more), and (9) preferential runways (Atlanta; Miami; Tampa; San Juan;
O'Hare, Chicago; Denver, Moisant, New Orleans; Newark and many more).
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would satisfy the concerns of both those in and those affected by the air
transportation industry. The FAA should remain at the helm of any
program so that the transportation industry remains both national and
uniform; airport proprietors should not be the sole entity to bear the
liability burden; air carriers should not be faced with the uncertainty
resulting from locally designed noise abatement rules and regulations;
noise impacted residents should not continue to be subjected to high
levels of aircraft noise; and, most importantly, the users of the system,
passengers, the airline industry, and others, should pay for the damages
caused by aircraft noise.
These concerns can be satisfied by the creation of a federal match-
ing grants program similar to the plan created by the Airport and Air-
way Development Act. However, the framework established in AADA
is not adequate. For one reason, although currently more than three
billion dollars remain in the Airport Trust Fund, 3 4 the FAA presently
has authority to award only minor grants for noise abatement projects.
Second, user taxes are no longer funneled into the Trust Fund; since
September 30, 1981, they have been siphoned off into the general
fund.135 The following is a compendium of the essential components of
a noise abatement program that should satisfy most of the concerns of
all parties involved:
1. A Noise Abatement Trust Fund (NATF) should be created.
The NATF must be separate from the Trust Fund established by
AADA or its replacement. Additionally, the AADA Trust Fund
should no longer fund the limited noise abatement projects it now
funds. A certain portion of the existing AADA Trust Fund should be
transferred to NATF to put NATF solidly on its feet from its incep-
tion.' 36 This amount should approximate the amounts that would rea-
sonably have been allocated to noise projects from the AADA Trust
Fund. Moreover, the NATF should be scrupulously administered so
that the monies received are actually spent on valid noise abatement
projects and not squandered in the federal treasury or spent for non-
trust fund purposes.
134. As of October 31, 1980, the Airport and Airways Trust Fund balance was $5.36
billion, down from $5.44 billion at the end of September, 1980. In addition, no user taxes
were collected during October, 1980. 253 AVIATION DAILY 4 (1981). As of May, 1981, $3.6
billion remained. Creedy, Vital Issues Up For Grabs in Legslative Grist Mill, COMMUTER
Am, May 15, 1981, at 55 [hereinafter cited as Creedy].
135. Creedy, supra note 134, at 55.
136. This may prove difficult, however. Capitol Hill sources indicate there may be a
battle over what happens to the Airport Trust Fund proceeds, and it does not appear that
noise abatement has high priority on the allocation list. Id. at 54.
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2. The current "user taxes" established by AADA must continue
with a portion of the revenues going to the AADA Trust Fund and a
portion to the NATF. The prohibition against state and local "head
taxes" should continue, so that the user taxes will remain uniform
throughout the United States. Whether such taxes should be increased
or decreased would depend on projected needs.
3. The FAA should continue in its role of determining which
noise abatement projects should be funded. Thus, most of the FAA's
decisions in this area would remain discretionary. However, where
there is an overriding public necessity, the FAA would be mandated to
make specific noise abatement grants.
137
4. No airport proprietor or other governmental agency should be
eligible for grants unless the airport proprietor first submits a "noise
exposure map" and an "airport noise compatibility plan" as currently
outlined by both the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979
and its implementing regulations. 3 Several airports are in the process
of preparing such plans.'
39
5. All legitimate noise claims within a certain noise exposure
area would be eligible for grants once an appropriate "Airport Noise
Compatibility Plan" is approved by the FAA. These grants should be
funded from the NATF. Legitimate claims would include only those
permitted by that particular state, thus new causes of action would not
be created. Preferably the entire claims system would be administra-
tive, perhaps modeled after the workers compensation claim process.
The LdN 65 noise contourI4° proposed in Part 150 would be an ade-
quate compromise. It is envisioned that an airport proprietor's airport
noise compatibility plans will contain alternative noise abatement rec-
137. This suggestion is not unlike that made by FAA Administrator J. Lynn Helms in a
recent speech in Dallas, Texas. Mr. Helms indicated that the FAA is preparing legislation
for presentation to Congress this summer that would require some form of FAA review and
approval of local airport restrictions. Mr. Helms stated that the FAA's perspective in this
review process would be "national in scope. . . recognizing that the closing of an airport
even for one hour has effects on the national air transportation system well beyond the local
community." See Simison, FAA Fi'hting 'Unrealistic' 4irport Noise Regulations, Daily
News (Van Nuys, Cal.), Feb. 19, 1982 at 1, col. 4.
138. 46 Fed. Reg. 8,338 (1981) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 150).
139. For example, Los Angeles International Airport has its Airport Noise Control and
Land Use Compatibility Study (ANCLUC) in progress. Representatives of the cities of Los
Angeles, Inglewood, El Segundo, and Hawthorne, as well as the County of Los Angeles,
meet on a regular basis to gather data in order to prepare a noise exposure map and the
required noise compatibility plan. It should be completed within a year. Statement of Mau-
rice Laham, Los Angeles International Airport Environmental Coordinator, to John M.
Werlich (July 1, 1981).
140. See supra note 20 for a discussion of LdN.
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ommendations. Such recommendations would be made by the airport
proprietor after consultation with representatives of noise-affected
communities and other public interest groups within the 65 LdN con-
tour. The recommendations might urge soundproofing certain homes
and/or schools, construction- of sound barriers on or near the airport,
land conversion of one form or another, acquisition of air easements by
the airport proprietor, condemnation of the most severely impacted res-
idential properties, or, perhaps even the institution of a "dollars for
decibels" fee at a particular airport.1 4' The FAA would have discretion
in determining what is a legitimate claim. Most likely, it would be
guided by the number of claims in a particular area, and perhaps it
would place limits on the amount a claimant could receive for non-
physical (e.g., emotional distress) personal injury claims. After all, in
part, the purpose of the NATF is to pay for noise damage and reduce
the impact of aircraft noise.
6. In order to qualify for grants, the airport proprietor would
have to follow the reasonable recommendations of the FAA with refer-
ence to noise abatement procedures that must be instituted by the pro-
prietor. For example, if the FAA approves a plan to construct a sound
barrier, the airport proprietor would have to comply or risk not only
being declared ineligible for a specific grant, but also risk absorbing
100% of future noise damage claims.
7. The federal government would be legally liable only for the
payment of airport noise-related damage claims as provided for in the
NATF program. Thus, within constitutional limitations the federal
government could not be made a defendant in an aircraft noise suit.
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout this article it has been assumed that Congress wishes
to maintain a uniform national air transportation system. If this is cor-
rect, something must be done before the system becomes chaotic. The
concept of sole liability hangs over the heads of airport proprietors like
the sword of Damocles, and they can react in only one way: self-de-
fense. The authors' recommendations offer a reasonable compromise
between total preemption and complete federal abdication. The former
141. Some commentators have suggested that noise-based landing fees, keyed to the nois-
iest aircraft, should be part of a' comprehensive plan for the abatement of aircraft noise. See
Baxter & Altree, LegalAspects ofAirport Noise, 15 J.L. & ECON. 1, 70 (1972), Ellingsworth,
Noise Policy Stirs Industry/DOTDebate, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 6, 1976, at
24; Bell & Bell, Airport Noise" Legal Developments and Economic Alternatives, 8 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 607, 608 (1980).
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is probably too costly and ignores local prerogatives, while the latter is
equally costly at the local level and is potentially destructive of any
national transportation scheme. Either the institutionalization of
shared liability or the creation of proper noise abatement funding
would go a long way toward helping to prevent the fractionalization of
the nation's air transportation system by nonuniform local or court-
imposed solutions to airport noise problems. Simultaneously, the
adoption of either approach would eliminate the airport proprietors'
greatest continuing fear: shared responsibility/single liability.
